Veteran Commander Blames Reformists for War-time Failures

Every year, during the last week of September, Iranians commemorate  one of the most important events in the country’s recent history: the start of the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988. Though it’s a time of looking back — to consider the events that led the war, and assess the economic and social consequences, the role of domestic politics and the UN Security Council Resolution 598 that ended it — it’s also a time when Iranians take stock of the most pressing issues defining their country today.

This year, the anniversary was marked by controversy, fuelled by a televised interview with Mohsen Rezaee, commander of the Iranian forces during the eight-year war. Well known for his controversial appeal to Ayatollah Khomenei to introduce nuclear weapons to the war effort, this year, during a broadcast on state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) television, Rezaee called for Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mir-Hossein Mousavi to be held accountable for their conduct during the conflict.

Rezaee accused Mir-Hossein Mousavi, presidential candidate in the disputed 2009 election and the leader of the Green Movement, of failing to provide necessary financial and logistical support to the war effort, which he says led to compromised and weak military forces. At the time, Mousavi was prime minister: his government was responsible for securing necessary financial resources for the war.

Rezaee’s comments also indirectly criticised the current president, Hassan Rouhani. During the war, Rouhani was a prominent figure in a political association called the Assembly of the Wise. The name was facetious and sarcastic, according to Rezaee. “It meant those in the battlefield are devoid of wisdom. The effects of such talk were dangerous and sapped the morale of the fighters. I wrote a letter to Imam [Khomeini] and he ordered their sessions to stop.” As the war’s commander, Rezaee was a controversial figure, and some prominent military figures called for him to be removed or even put on trial. But today, he is one of the closest figures to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Supporters of Mir-Hossein Moussavi, who is currently under house arrest and not allowed any contact with the media, have repeatedly denied the allegations against him, claiming that failures stemmed from poor leadership among high-ranking military officers and the failure to procure the necessary military equipment from the international market, and not because the government had not allocated the necessary funds.

In the past, Rouhani has attributed Iranian defeats in the closing years of the war to military commanders who neglected their responsibilities in order to advance their standing in politics. As an example, he mentioned the 1988 fall of the Faw Peninsula, a marshy region in the Persian Gulf between Iran and Iraq, which Iranians had occupied in 1986. According to Rouhani, when the Iranians were on the verge of defeat in Faw, commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were at a political meeting in western Iran.

In the recently broadcast interview, Rezaee suggested that he had been the target of these types of attacks, and that he had been accused of trying to procure extensive powers to ensure the Revolutionary Guards were at the helm of Iranian politics and position himself for the presidency of the Islamic Republic.

The Ghosts of the War and Nuclear Talks

This rehashing of old arguments and attempt to apportion blame have a significant impact on current Iranian politics. Many of the same military and political figures who were in charge during the war are still in positions of power, and continue to use the war for their own agendas.

The best example is the battle over the nuclear program. Over the past few months, hardliners have adopted a two-pronged approach in their attempts to sabotage any nuclear agreement with P5+1 countries. Through the media and in speeches, they reminded the Iranian public of the UN Security Council Resolution 598 of 1987, which called for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, portraying it as a defeat for Iran and a grave insult to Ayatollah Khomeini. They placed the blame on three active politicians: Hashemi Rafsanjani, Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, currently foreign minister, who they described as instrumental players in the events of 1987.

Their next step has been to compare Rouhani’s attempts to reach a nuclear agreement with the 5+1 group of countries to the acceptance of Resolution 598. Backing down on the nuclear program in any way, they suggest, would be on par with the surrender of 1987. And the damage caused to the Supreme Leader would be yet another diplomatic disaster, echoing the mistakes of the past and creating problems for decades to come, both internationally and domestically.

A History of Controversy

One of former commander Rezaee’s most controversial moves was his 1988 letter to Ayatollah Khomeini, in which he asked for extensive military measures to secure victory over Iraq, including nuclear weapons. He argued that the war could not be won without them. Although former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had once mentioned the contents of the letter during his tenure, this year's commemorations were the first time the subject had been broached on state-run television.

Rezaee wrote the letter at the request of Hashemi Rafsanjani, now the chair of the Influential Expediency Discernment Council. At the time he was the deputy to Ayatollah Khomeini in charge of supervising the Joint Chiefs of Staff and coordinating military forces, especially the army and the Revolutionary Guards. The letter first came to light in the memoirs of Ayatollah Montazeri, who was heir-apparent to Ayatollah Khomeini during the war and who was later pushed aside due to vast political differences with him.

In his letter to Khomeini, Rezaee also made other unusual requests. He wanted males between 17 and 50 years of age to serve four months on the frontlines each year. The government and the parliament were to give the control of the national budget to the leadership of armed forces — a move that would have resulted in the militarization of the government, intentionally or not. He also asked for thousands of tanks and 500 warplanes. Iran could not procure the tanks and warplanes in the international market; in his televised interview, Rezaee said that he had expected them to be manufactured domestically.

Rezaee’s remarks are strong reminders that the Iranian military has a long-standing desire to enter politics: he himself has run for the office of president three times.

Ongoing disagreements between the Revolutionary Guards and the army have been one of the least explored issues of the Iran-Iraq war. But, despite a few rifts this year, in which various army officials spoke out and Revolutionary Guards commanders answered back, most of those involved have chosen to remain quiet on the subject in the interest of protecting overall national security. It will no doubt be some time before the subject is openly and fully addressed in public.

How the war ended has also become a point of contention this year. Many critics of the regime claim Ayatollah Khomeini and his circle could have ended the war during the first year, preventing the extensive damage that followed. They say that after a few military victories against Iraq, Khomeini and his people became arrogant, bent on total victory and putting Saddam Hussein on trial. They repeatedly rejected overtures for peace from Western and Arab countries.

Military officials and political leaders from the time have their own answers to these claims. They say that Western proposals were defective and did not take into account Iranian rights. Or they claim a substantial  victory was necessary in order to have a strong hand at the negotiating table.

What is obvious is that, whatever the arguments, they play a role in what happens today. The Iran-Iraq war and its aftermath will be reinterpreted again and again, leaving many questions unanswered and posing new ones, but more than anything, being recast to fit a range of political agendas.