“There Must be a Fundamental Change in How Iran is Governed”

Nawaf Obaid is a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. He is also Special Counselor to Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, former director of Saudi Arabia’s Intelligence Agency and Saudi Arabia’s former ambassador to the United States. In the following interview, Mr. Obaid commented on the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham and discussed the broader history of the relationship.

What is the Saudi view of the Syria conflict, as it has unfolded since 2011?

The president [Bashar al-Assad] and that clique of people ruling with him need to go. The Iranians believe this is a fundamental strategic issue, that if this happens it will break this messianic project of trying to expand their influence all the way to Lebanon, of dealing with groups and not with countries per se, of being able to support local Shia communities.

Over the long term it’s a failing issue, because at no time in history—in European, African, Asian history—has a head of state that’s done so much harm to his country been able to survive in the long term. I don’t see why he should be any different.

How does Iran fit into that endgame?

It doesn’t, because Iran will do anything not for that to happen. But where we have a more difficult problem is when he goes, what comes after? And if Iraq is any example, it’s as dangerous if not more so, because today you have this movement that has taken over a good part of northern Syria, it’s taken over most of the northern part of Iraq, it’s taken over Iraq’s second largest city, it’s a disaster. Iran, as much as it will continue to defend its [Shia] communities, simply doesn’t have the power or the resources to take over these countries.

To what extent have Iranian actions in Syria, and their support for Bashar al-Assad, contributed to the formation of ISIS?

To a very large extent. The Iranians, with their delusional policy in Syria, have created a monster that has substantial popular support in both countries and hence will be practically impossible to defeat. Sooner or later, the murderous Assad regime will fall and with it, Iran's dream of a grand sphere of influence from Tehran to Beirut.

Would you say that Iran's support for the Iraqi government and Shia militia groups, such as Jeish al-Mahdi, influenced the rise of ISIS?

This sectarian policy they have adopted in Syria and Iraq is coming back to burn them. Over the medium to long term, geography, demographics and economic resources are so titled toward the Sunnis across the Muslim world, that this is a battle they will lose. ISIS and the other Al Qaeda franchises cannot be defeated by the entire might of the US let alone Iran or the crumbling Maliki regime. 

Some observers have accused Saudi Arabia of supporting ISIS.

ISIS is on Saudi Arabia's official list of terrorist organizations. The Kingdom absolutely does not support ISIS. ISIS as an Al Qaeda-affiliated movement was always considered a terrorist organization by the Kingdom and at no time would the Saudi government or any of its affiliated agencies have supported ISIS or any of its activities in Syria and Iraq.

Is there a sense in which Iran’s isolation benefits Saudi Arabia, or would Saudi Arabia prefer to normalize its relations with Iran?

If they’re willing to come back into the fold, all the better, but for this to happen, there must be a fundamental change in how Iran is governed. And the interests of the people who rule right now would be counter to a lot of what would be needed for Iran to be a status quo, open country in the region.

It would mean taking away the nuclear [weapons] program, stopping the funding of all these ridiculous militias across the Arab world, opening up their oil and gas sectors to foreign companies to bring up the export potential of Iran to where it should be, opening up the other key industries: telecommunications, aviation.

If they’re serious about having a deal, we’d be all for it. But from the history we have—[including] the attempted assassination of the ambassador—it’s the same people who ultimately have the last say on these things. They have not spent so much of their country’s resources, made so many sacrifices, in order to make a deal in the way they are doing with the Americans in order to get some sanctions relief. So we don’t believe they can actually do a deal.

What role do you see domestic actors playing in the relationship in both Iran and Saudi Arabia?

Unfortunately in Saudi Arabia you have non-state actors who keep playing the sectarian card, and it’s to their advantage, because there you’re putting up the wider Muslim Sunni world against [the Iranians]. That prohibits any serious rapprochement.

The same with the Iranians. If you listen to what the Iranians say, ‘[Saudi Arabia] is a Salafi, jihadi [country]. Be careful, they’re out to destroy Iran,” that brings in fear from the Shias in Iran, and in other Arab countries.

On the perception level, [it’s] a big problem. Government-to-government—governments are more lucid than their people—we have a president in Iran who is much more lucid than the previous one, who brings in more reason and balance. The country’s nearly bankrupt, the public finances are in disarray, and he needs to keep the country going. This is where we’re going, toward a dampening down of tensions between the two countries for the time being.

Where do you see the relationship between the two countries going in the near future?

I think tensions will subside, but I don’t think there will be any serious breakthrough, because Rouhani is not the ultimate decision maker. Does Iran want to be a country that realizes its natural capabilities and tries to develop normally, or are they still with that messianic belief that they are a great country, that they can do everything? It’s also about them realizing how they want to be perceived and how they want to go about developing the country, and knowing their true potential, and working on it.

This is an edited version of the interview. For the full interview, click here.