Is Ahmadinejad on His Way Back to Mainstream Politics?

Is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad making a comeback? Amid rumors that the former president plans to run for the mid-term parliamentary elections and the launch of at least two new pro-Ahmadinejad websites, there are signs that the former statesman could be set to re-enter the country’s political landscape with gusto.

Iranian media has been quick to cover developments, with Shargh newspaper reporting that pro-Ahmadinejad bloggers have met to discuss strategy and future plans. One of the former president's allies, Gholam-Hossein Elham, who held a number of positions during his administration, recently called for Ahmadinejad supporters to unite. There have been regular meetings between Ahmadinejad, former vice presidents and some members of his cabinet.

But anti-Ahmadinejad rhetoric has been rife too, with hardliner MP Ahmad Tavakoli joking that “God created Ahmadinejad but later regretted it and broke the mold” and going on to quote ex-speaker of the parliament Haddad Adel, who simply said, “Forget that such a person ever existed.”

Despite this criticism from some of Ahmadinejad’s fiercest critics, for some, it’s clear that Ahmadinejad is on his way back.

Over the last year, the former president has worked hard to present himself as an ordinary, non-controversial supporter of the Islamic Republic and its values, taking part in Friday Prayers and attending funerals for martyrs and for some government figures. Over the new year holiday, he visited the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war, following in the footsteps of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

Though he has no party affiliation and frequently butts heads with some of the country’s more fundamentalist parties and figures, Ahmadinejad has enjoyed reasonable success over the last year, being appointed to the influential Expediency Council and returning to his former job at the University of Science and Technology. Both positions are potentially useful footholds for gaining power in the future. In addition, those who became rich during the course of his eight-year presidency are likely to provide him with financial support.

Khamenei's Balancing Act 

Undoubtedly, Ahmadinejad’s character must be taken into account when assessing his future role. His media savvy combined with an unwavering commitment to preparing the ground for the return of the “hidden” (or twelfth) imam make him a unique force in Iranian politics.

And though he is ambitious and stubborn, he also has a thin skin. In 2011, when Khamenei forced Ahmadinejad to retain Heydar Moslehi as his minister of intelligence, he left the presidential palace and retired to his private residence. For 11 days, he refused to chair the cabinet.

Not only is he driven by a zealous nature and a strong desire for fame, Ahmadinejad also has a pronounced vindictive streak. Frequent clashes with opponents during his presidency – particularly with the speaker of the parliament, Ali Larijani and his circle of supporters –show his willingness to use any opportunity to exact political revenge. When the Guardian Council rejected his chief of staff Rahim Mashaei as a presidential candidate last year, he regarded the move as a personal affront and a great injustice. There are signs that he is now ready to retaliate. 

But Ahmadinejad’s future must also be seen in the context of Iran’s broader political landscape. Ayatollah Khamenei is fond of balancing various political currencies, so he has good reason to keep Ahmadinejad in his sights and at some level of the power hierarchy. At the same time, Khamenei has invested more trust in Ahmadinejad than most fundamentalists have felt comfortable doing.

Khamenei has used this balancing act before. When Ahmadinejad selected Mashaei as his first vice president, Ayatollah Khamenei wrote to the president, warning him that the choice was ill thought out and would lead to divisions within Iran’s political elite. Following the turbulent aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections, Mashaei was dismissed. But although some high-level ayatollahs accused him of “pagan nationalism” after he stated that “without Iran, Islam would be lost,” Khamenei explicitly rejected such an interpretation and insisted that Mashaei would still be considered for future positions.

Khamenei also pardoned Mohammed Sharif Malekzadeh, a close ally of Ahmadinejad and the former head of the Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organization who was accused of financial corruption. In some cases, the Iranian judiciary failed to prosecute members of Ahmadinejad’s administration, suggesting that, although Khamenei might have been unhappy with Ahmadinejad, he had no intention of crushing his entire power base.

Ahmadinejad still has a strong circle of influential supporters and allies, but many of them, including Sharif Malekzadeh and Mashaei, are themselves the subjects of suspicion and scrutiny. His former first vice president Mohammad-Reza Rahimi faced corruption charges, as did former managing director of the Social Security Organization Saeed Mortazavi. Some hardliners remain hostile towards figures like Mashaei and the executive vice-president Hamid Baghaei, who was banned from holding government jobs for four years in 2011. 

An Uncertain Future

It’s clear the supreme leader would not welcome a wholesale return of Ahmadinejad and his cronies to the political stage. For the most part, Ahmadinejad’s relationship with the clergy has been rocky to say the least. 

Yet there are other factors that could support and strengthen Ahmadinejad’s allies. After all, the success of Rouhani’s administration is far from certain. The fundamentalist faction in Iran lacks organizational cohesion or a central political figure, despite concerted efforts to change this by the Assembly of Experts' chairman Mahdavi Kani and the hardliner ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, among others. Speaker of the parliament Ali Larijani is perhaps the hardliners’ most prominent figure, but attempts to rally full support for him is unlikely to be successful.

However, the absence of a clear leader does not mean that Ahmadinejad and his allies are necessarily positioned to regain power. Iran’s hardliners paid a price when they pulled the rug from under Mashaei – and they are ready to pay an even higher price now. Some are determined to use legal means to make Ahmadinejad pay, seeking further evidence of corruption among his ranks.  

And of course Ahmadinejad is far from popular on the international stage. For the majority of international players, his departure signals the end to an unfortunate period and a much-needed change in direction for Iranian foreign policy. Among the few exceptions are the government of Venezuela and the Venezuelan embassy in Iran, where Ahmadinejad’s supporters occasionally gather to take photographs.

Among fundamentalists, Ahmadinejad is almost uniformly disliked. The only notable exception is Iranian-Iraqi politician and cleric Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, with whom some of Ahmadinejad’s allies remain close. He is one of the few prominent figures in Iran who has not explicitly come out against Ahmadinejad and his team. At the same time, he is both ideologically close to Ayatollah Khamenei and greatly influential in Iraq. There are many who believe that he is beginning to position himself to succeed Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader.

But despite Shahroudi’s influence among the higher echelons of politics, he is also vulnerable. He does not hold much clout in Iranian society, lacking grassroot support. When Mashaei was disqualified as a presidential candidate, some Ahmadinejad supporters complained that Shahroudi had not used his influence and power to support his candidacy. Because of his status and considerable power, the complaints were short-lived. But the fact that they happened at all signals a dent in his own political armor.

For the past three decades, Iranian politics have been shaped by head-to-head rivalries, like the one that set Khamenei against MIr Hossein Moussavi, who was once his prime minister. The long-running battle between Ahmadinejad and Larijani, involving accusations of corruption and incompetence on both sides, could easily turn into a conflict between Shahroudi and Larijani.

Though analysis of Ahmadinejad’s reputation and track record has often focused on his opposition to reform and his impact on the economy, it is these battles – between personalities, political factions and religious divisions – that really matter. How they are resolved and absorbed into the fabric of Iranian politics will be a determining force in Ahmadinejad’s political future.