Did Ahmadinejad Hate The Clergy?

Was former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad opposed to the central ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran? In order to find an answer, one must reflect on the Shi’ite worldview, with all of its convoluted twists and turns – not by any means an easy task for Westerners.

It is perhaps instructive to look at the history of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Catholics believe that the pope is the vicar of Christ. He acts in Jesus’s name and spirit until Christ’s return.

Shi’ite Muslims have a similar theology. The 12^th imam of Shi’as, Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Mahdi (or simply Mahdi) disappeared in 874 AD at the age of four, and he is expected to return, some say with Jesus Christ, to bring peace and justice to the world.

In the meantime, what are the Shi’ites to do?

For a long time, the answer was “stay away from politics and do the best you can”. So the faithful Shi’ites and their clergy lived in a world parallel to the political world. They acquiesced to the governing powers with reluctance. In essence, faithful Shi’ites followed Jesus’s command: “Give back to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's.” And “God” was represented by the Shi’ite clergy, mosques and religious foundations.

Before The Return

But the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, changed that. Inspired by a lesser known ideology, he espoused the idea of Velayat-e Faqih, or the “Guardianship of the (Islamic) Jurist”, which maintains that during the absence (occultation) of the 12^th Imam, the Shi’ite clergy are his “vicars”.

But what if the signs indicate that Mahdi will return soon? Is there a need for a vicar? It is here that the controversy over former president Ahmadinejad’s beliefs arises.

Rumors about Ahmadinejad’s anti-velayat views are not new, but they were revived when staunch conservative and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Rafighdoost, quoted one of Ahmadinejad’s former cabinet ministers, Mohammad Saeedi-Kia: “There is nobody more anti-velayat under the sky than Ahmadinejad,” he was reported to have said. According to Rafighdoost, the minister offered his resignation to the Supreme Leader, but Khamenei asked him to stay in office until the end of his term.

Most of the accusations against Ahmadinejad are a result of his disobedience against the Supreme Leader. In one example, Ahmadinejad dismissed the intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, and refused to recognize his reinstatement by Khamenei days later.

But there is other evidence that Ahmadinejad’s beliefs went against widely-held Shi’ite opinion. A few years ago, Hossein Fadaei, secretary-general of the Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution, of which Ahmadinejad was a founding member, described the beliefs of the organization: “The occultation era [of Mahdi] is over and this is the era of his presence.” The current era is not one of Velayat-e Faqih, he said, because when Mahdi himself can guide, there is no need for any other leadership.

Some members of the Shi’ite clergy support these beliefs. One of them, Hassan Abtahi, wrote a book, the title of which can roughly be translated as   Meeting With Mahdi (the original Persian title is perhaps more forthright). In it, he argued that Mahdi’s return would not happen suddenly; prior to his reappearance, one can expect an “introduction”, a period signaling the beginning of the process. For some, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been such an introduction.

Political repercussions

It’s important not to forget, however, that Khamenei’s political and religious record has provided considerable support for this movement. In 2005, as a means of sidelining former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, who planned to return to the presidency, Khamenei demonstrated his strong support for Ahmadinejad, albeit indirectly. Ahmadinejad kissed the Supreme Leader’s hands in public and it appeared that they had formed a close and deep relationship. It was only later that signs of Ahmadinejad’s disobedience began to emerge. In 2009, he actively supported the re-election of Ahmadinejad and discouraged fundamentalist figures from running against him, believing that no one else could beat Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who fundamentalists considered to be one of the last remnants of the leftist or reformist movement. Defeating Mousavi, it was believed, would help banish people who shared his views, along with Rafsanjani, to the margins of Iranian political life. Mousavi lost in what what widely regarded to be a fraudulent election. The tactics used against him have had significant repercussions.

Beyond the political dimension, some fundamentalist supporters of Khamenei have fanned the flame of the “re-emergence” movement. They have talked about the signs and even the date of Mahdi’s return. They have hinted that he may have returned already and is in communication with  Khamenei. For example, the director of Khamenei’s office has commented that the Jamkaran mosque in the holy city of Qom “is not like any other mosque”. The interim leader of Tehran’s Friday Prayer has gone even further, identifying places where Khamenei goes to “be alone” with Mahdi.

Another example is told by a member of the Assembly of Experts, which he attributes to Hasan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hezbollah in Lebanon. “Once we were in the presence of the Supreme Leader,” Nasrallah is reported to have said. “We were in the worst possible situation...there were many conspiracies to destroy Hezbollah,” he added and then said that Khamenei reassured him that Hezbollah would be victorious. When he faces extreme difficulties, Khamenei is supposed to have said, he visits Jamkaran mosque and an “invisible hand” directs him.

The Real Losers

In addition to Mohsen Rafighdoost’s statements about Ahmadinejad’s anti-velayat beliefs, the conservative spoke of Ahmadinejad’s animosity towards the country’s influential clerics. “At the end of the third year,” he said, “I asked Ahmadinejad’s reasons for his hostility” towards the clergy. According to him, Ahmadinejad asked rhetorically: “What are they good for? They have a comfortable life and are not worried about their next meal. But in my second term, I will plunge the knife.”

The minister has denied this part of the conversation. But whether he denies it or not, it is clear that there was a significant rift between Ahmadinejad and the clergy.

When Ahmadinejad became president, he hoped to develop a close relationship with Qom’s influential seminary. His government even announced that it would increase the theological institution’s budget. Little by little, however, as he began to implement his policies, the relationship soured. Some high-level clerics spoke against him publicly. One of his early supporters, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, later referred to Ahmadinejad’s circle of closest supporters “the most dangerous current” since the beginning of Islam. The clerics complained to the Supreme Leader, but he continued to defend the president until Ahmadinejad’s disobedience in 2011 over the firing of the intelligence minister, Moslehi. In 2013, Khamenei criticised Ahmadinejad after he defamed the brother of Ali Larijani, the brother of the speaker of parliament, by playing an audio recording that allegedly proved the man’s involvement in shady business deals.

But Ahmadinejad has not been the ultimate loser. When Hassan Rouhani became president in June 2013, some of Ahmadinejad’s supporters characterized the election as a plot to remove non-clerical figures from the levers of power. Ahmadinejad’s protests against the clergy have even had  some support from the Iranian public.

In this complicated series of events, it is the Supreme Leader’s position that has been most compromised. For eight years, Khamenei has consistently offered an open invitation to anyone who wishes to analyze these theological questions with insight and wisdom. But it has become clear that both the government and Iranian society have paid a heavy price for Khamenei’s support of Ahmadinejad.

In four years’ time, Ahmadinejad will be in a position to run for the presidency again. Mohsen Rafighdoost warns against it: “We must be careful not to be swindled as we were eight years ago.” What he does not mention, or perhaps does not dare to mention, is who the swindler was.

He does not need to. It’s obvious.