The Islamic republic of Iran is a theocracy, so it should come as no surprise that political disputes manifest themselves as theological quarrels. The specifics of these debates and the cast of characters involved can prove baffling, arcane and often incomprehensible, particularly to the secular Western mindset, which is far removed from the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These doctrinal conflicts, however, can have real and serious consequences, both in Iran and for Iran.
The latest chapter in this theological saga involves Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, a great influence on the founding ideology of the Islamic Republic. Motahari was assassinated in May 1979, a couple of months after the republic was established. A terrorist Islamic group claimed responsibility.
Ayatollah Motahari was also the father of Ali Motahari, the indomitable member of parliament who has repeatedly rubbed the establishment the wrong way. Though he is in no way a reformist, he has championed the release of the leaders of the Green Movement and does not shy away from reminding his critics who his father was.
Recently, Ali-Akbar Rashad, the chair of the council of the Islamic seminaries of Tehran, reported that Ayatollah Motahari had been “cursed” during a series of “sessions” in the capital. This in itself is not unprecedented. A few years ago, a supporter of Ahmadinejad claimed that not only Motahari, but also Ayatollah Khomeini, had been insulted during religious meetings held in the holy city of Mashhad. But this time, Rashad warned of the dangers of such meetings increasing and spreading more widely throughout Iran.
Fundamental Differences
Rashad is close to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and runs Khamenei’s publications office. It is only logical that he would praise Khamenei and condemn his critics. His support has certainly been emphatic:
Rashad has stated that after Mahdi – the 12th imam who mainstream Shi’ites believe will return to bring peace and justice to the world (along with Jesus Christ, according to some accounts) – Khamenei is the closest living person to the Kingdom of God.
Imam Ali, the Prophet Mohammad’s son-in-law, once said that, if a government failed to be just, his torn shoes would be more valuable than that government. Shi’ites believe that Imam Ali, along with his descendants, is the rightful heir to the prophet. According to Rashad, Khamenei’s shoes “are torn too”, meaning Khamenei would refuse to support an unjust government.
According to the Quran and its traditions, God has 99 names, as well as many more that are hidden from human beings. Rashad declared that “Ali”, Khamenei’s first name, is one of these names.
Morteza Motahari’s ideas are still very influential because of his closeness to Ayatollah Khomeini. Religious literature often describes him as a “high scholar” or celebrates him in similar laudatory terms. When honoring ideological leader and hardline cleric Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Khamenei himself described him as the “Motahari of our time”.
At the same time, many believe that there are fundamental ideological differences between Motahari and Khamenei. And Motahari’s son Ali symbolizes some of these differences.
Ali Motahari has hit the headlines in recent months as a result of his indirect criticism of the Supreme Leader and his not-so-indirect attacks on institutions under his control, such as the Revolutionary Guards. Ali Motahari stood up to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and his followers. He has also become embroiled in a noisy public quarrel with the Iranian judiciary.
About “Narrationism”
In Arabic, the word Ijtihad literally means “diligence”. As an Islamic legal term, it translates as “independent reasoning”, which, in some schools of Islam is considered a valid strategy for decision- making. A mujtahid is a jurist qualified to make decisions on the basis of his extensive knowledge, experience and strong character. The faithful must choose a mujtahid to follow.
Not all Islamic schools of belief, however, agree that Ijtihad is legitimate for decision-making. Some Shi’ite jurists believe that to arrive at legitimate religious rulings, narratives from the lives of the twelve imams, based on the Quran and accounts from the life of the prophet, are enough. These “narrationists” consider Ijtihad to be unlawful. To them, only Shi’ite imams can be “followed”.
On the other side of the divide we find “principalists”, who do believe in Ijtihad. In addition to the Quran’s teaching and traditions, they believe that “reason” and “consensus” are the two other valid sources for arriving at legitimate rulings. Therefore, they consider following a mujtahid as valid.
To narrationists, however, following reason or consensus is wrong. They argue that Abu Bakr, the first caliph, was elected this way. Shi’ites reject the belief that Abu Bakr was elected to lead Muslims after the death of Prophet Mohammad in AD 632. As a result, narrationists do not accept that mujtahids can act as “deputies” to the twelfth imam until he returns.
This view means that narrationists are essentially non-political and that they are opposed to clerics who engage in government affairs. In the later years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, some of his supporters and mentors talked about the return of the 12th imam Mahdi, which they believed was imminent. For them, Mahdi’s “long absence” is over; he observes people and their actions, and, because of this, it is unnecessary for clerics to continue as his deputies.
A Rehearsal
Ahmadinejad himself never explicitly professed these views, but repeatedly said that the “Guardianship of the Jurist” (the theoretical foundation of the Islamic Republic) is a “rehearsal” for Mahdi’s just society. However, principalists do not agree that the Islamic Republic should be referred to as a “rehearsal”.
Ahmadinejad made news when, at the funeral of the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, he said that Chavez would return to earth along with Jesus and Mahdi (though he did not use Chavez’s name directly). This statement was taken as a sign of hostility towards the mujtahids and their dominance in the government.
This attitude has been growing in Iran since 2001. A CD entitled “Towards Return” met with great success.
Another school of thought, “Separation”, which has many strong supporters in the holy city of Mashhad, has been compared to the narrationist movement, though separationists deny any links between the two schools of thought.
Critics of the narrationist movement also draw a comparison with the Hojjatieh Society which, according to Wikipedia, “is a traditionalist Shi'a lay religious organization...that stresses adherence to orthodoxy” through evangelism and non-violence. Some members of the upper echelons of the establishment have sympathy with the society.
An Opportunity For Secularism
Other critics have pointed to the intensification of conflicts between Sunnis and Shi’ites, the increasing popularity of nihilistic ideas and the growing market for the interpretations of dreams, as well as the high numbers of books sold about subjects such as “Quranic medicine”.
It’s clear that the political and religious consequences of narrationism have in recent months created more anxiety and discussion than other schools of thought. For narrationism’s critics, Ayatollah Morteza Motahari is still a prominent source of ideas. In addition to Motahari’s extensive criticism of narrationism, he accused its believers of empiricism and following the teachings of Sir Francis Bacon, the English philosopher from the 16th and 17th centuries.
Considering the narrationist belief in the separation of religion and politics, some have identified the spread of this philosophy as an opportunity for secularism. One critic has referred to narrationists as followers of John Locke, the 17th-century English Enlightenment philosopher and empiricist .
These theological and theoretical disputes are very good indicators of the diverse, numerous and sometimes deep rifts within the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The media seldom takes these religious and juristic disputes seriously enough, but events before and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 leave no doubt that the consequences of these fractures have a decisive role in how political structures and relations are shaped in Iran.
Interested in writing for IranWire?
Share your stories.
comments