What will be the consequences of Rouhani’s government nuclear success led by Mohammad Javad Zarif, his foreign minister? How justified is the wave of gratitude towards Zarif? Questions such as this are now marginal to the current atmosphere of media but they are starting to come forward.
There is no doubt that Zarif’s very strong and active diplomatic persona, his unique mastery of public diplomacy and his eloquence have created a new image for an Iranian diplomat. Iranians were happy that he was their representative in the negotiations. Moreover, in the new atmosphere, a large number of Iranian voters can defend the unrealized potential of the votes that they cast in the 2009 disputed elections and point out the positive diplomatic aspects of electing a moderate government.
This said, this important achievement by Zarif has its unpleasant and unsavory aspects as well; aspects which neither the establishment nor, sometimes, Rouhani’s government want to be exposed in the limelight.
1. Contrary to the government propaganda, published details show that the sanctions have been more paralyzing than expected. In recent months, like the last months of Ahmadinejad’s administration, government has been unable to take effective economic measures. Even in the coming months this trend will continue. As reports in the Western media show, sanctions on the two major sectors, oil and banking, cost Iran an average of 5 billion dollars a month. Even if Iran gains the maximum economic profit from the breathing space provided by the Geneva agreement, it is doubtful that it can compensate for the losses. From the viewpoint of eliminating the practical consequences of the sanctions at least, the government has not taken a significant step forward and may even find itself in a more unfavorable situation. The reported details also reveal the dimensions of economic damages which in the past decade has been inflicted on Iran and Iranians under the direct guidance of the Supreme Leader, a leader whose failures now seem respectable thanks to the Rouhani administration’s political and media skills.
2. Contrary to the slogans on resisting the Western greed, the Iranian negotiators were not able to put up much of a resistance due to the sorry situation left by the previous government and the Jalili negotiating team. Western countries forced Iran to accept a large number of their demands. In fact, it seems that Zarif and his colleagues were able to persuade the leader and the hardliners to consent to the agreement only at the last minute. Published details from the agreement make it clear that even in the last round before the accord, it was Iran’s reluctance to retreat which was a major factor in its failure, not sabotage by France or a secret conspiracy between Arabs and Israelis.
3. The agreement between Iran and Western countries, especially the United States, has taken place in a very brittle and unreliable environment. In addition to domestic pressures in America such as the strong movement in the senate to impose more sanctions, regional conflicts such as the civil war in Syria can lead to the disruption of the process . On the other hand, it seems that Iranians, especially the hardliners, have retreated as much as they ever would. In fact, if until yesterday they saw themselves as standing over an economic precipice, today they believe they are standing over a nuclear one. The bitter experience of 2005, when the Supreme Leader interfered in the nuclear negotiations and caused the suspension of agreements between Iran and Western countries, makes clear that the risk of going back to zero is very strong, not only on the Western side, but also domestically in Iran. Rouhani’s very clever letter to Khamenei and also Hashemi’s praise of Khamenei’s reply to Rouhani, is a show set up for preventing a repeat of the same unsavory experience. The Supreme Leader has shown time and again that he is not a reliable player and likes to maneuver frequently to sustain the balance of power. No doubt domestic hardliners will use this character trait to put pressure on the government and disrupt progress in negotiations.
4. This agreement is psychologically very significant but the psychological factor works like a double-edged sword. The tired public is now more hopeful and is looking forward to the improvements in the economic landscape, but a sharp rise in expectations will go hand-in-hand with the contentment. Today’s emphasis by the president that now it is the turn of economic activists originates from the same anxiety.
5. The success of the government in unravelling the nuclear knot and persuading the leader to retreat to 10 years ago has strengthened the impression that, given increased public pressure and powerful council from the government, solving the problem of political prisoners especially those under house arrest, will be treated positively by the ruling establishment and a new political atmosphere in the country would dawn. Slogans in support of Mir Hossein Moussavi, chanted in the welcoming ceremony for Zarif at the Mehrabad airport was a strong expression of this demand. Some of the Iranian reformists share a view with fundamentalists: It was not the sanctions that forced Iran into the agreement; it was the national force and the consensus generated by the 2009 elections which have enabled the government to coopt other domestic power centers and bring about changes in some areas such diplomacy.
This analytical approach and political expectations for the opening up of the political atmosphere will naturally put more pressure on the establishment and will direct more criticism at them, but it also increases the demands for government action. Based on evidence from the past, it is unlikely that hardline judicial and security institutions will scale down their actions against civil and political activists. Now that nuclear agreement crisis has relatively eased, handling these demands, expectations and actions will prove challenging for Rouhani’s government.
6. In spite of the above-mentioned risks, the current consensus among moderate-leaning fundamentalists to support the government’s nuclear success and the strong performance by Zarif and his colleagues has provided moderate reformers with a new opportunity. True, a figure like Zarif is more in tune with traditional fundamentalists than the reformists, but the social forces that potentially support Zarif are the same forces that are potential reformist supporters. Managed carefully and correctly, this social potential can lead to a stronger showing of reformists and Rouhani supporters in the future, especially in the upcoming parliamentary elections, and can put hardliners in a tougher situations.
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