President Rouhani Must Take Advantage of the Opportunity

Davoud Hermidas Bavand, a professor of international relations at Tehran University, spoke to IranWire as President Hassan Rouhani prepared to address the United Nations General Assembly. He spoke about the interplay between President Rouhani's domestic policies and his mandate to seek change and detente on the international stage. Bavand, a former head of the UNGA Legal Committee, said he that if the opportunity presents itself for President Rouhani to meet President Barack Obama, he should not hesitate to take advantage of it. “If total authority and decision-making power is not given to Mr. Rouhani and to the negotiating delegation, and if instructions have to be dictated for everything, then his assignment cannot move forward. If they have recognized that negotiations must be held then he must have the authority to do so.”

President Rouhani as spoken widely of securing sanctions relief and reducing tensions in foreign policy, but what leverage does he actually have to accomplish this?

There must be strategic unity, and also the authority and the position of Mr. Rouhani and the negotiating delegation must be strong. One of the first steps [Mr. Rouhani] must take is to release  the country’s political prisoners. Because, it is true that the priority is the nuclear issue and sanctions, but there are other issues on the margins that have an impact also. Therefore, Mr. Rouhani, who represents the Iranian people, must know that the people are seeking a way out of the existing bottlenecks and dead ends, and he must know one of their demands is for an open and free social environment. So, if during Mr. Rouhani’s tenure such an action is to take place, a higher status and greater ascension would enter into the negotiation equation, which is completely different from what existed previously. This would have a direct reflection. The aim must be to reach our goal. Any domestic action that can assist and facilitate the external negotiations must be facilitated. If we want to have domestic strategic unity, steps must be taken so that the Iranian side would enter the negotiations with more confidence.

Did this ‘strategic unity’ not exist prior to Mr. Rouhani's election?  

We did not have strategic unity before. Each organization was playing a different tune. The foreign minister was the last one to comment, and then his opinion was rejected. Now adequate authority must be given to Mr. Rouhani, and an environment must be created so that he can succeed in pushing his demands forward. When we say reducing tensions and dialogue, it means the negotiations must proceed according to mutual interests to achieve the desired goals. This process has a few stages. The sanctions themselves have categories also. Some of these the U.S. President himself can delay. The second group are approved by the US Congress but their implementation is left at the hands of the President. The third are the ones established by the Congress and the President must implement them and he has no other authority there. The first two categories of the sanctions could be lifted in a short time, but lifting some of the others are more problematic. About the sanctions that are imposed by the Security Council, it has been stipulated that if Iran complies with the demands of the members of the Council, then those sanctions could be lifted also, but of course lifting the Security Council’s sanctions needs the passage of a resolution by the Security Council.

In your opinion, can Mr. Rouhani create such a strategic consensus by talking about the problems that have been created, communicating more effectively with the media, and by opening the social environment for free dialogues around these problems?

He is not in a position where he can afford not to talk about these problems. He must bring up both the domestic problems and the foreign ones. It is true that some in the United States are thinking about regime change and the continuation, tightening, and the addition of further sanctions, but some others truly want to resolve these problems. We must consider the fact that the U.S. government, both when Mrs. Hillary Clinton was secretary of state and also with the new secretary of state, expressed its interest and readiness for bilateral negotiations. We must also enter into these constructive negotiations with the same intention and purpose so as to prevent the imposition of additional sanctions, and in the second phase, we must stop some of these sanctions whose implementation is postponed into the future. The third goal is stopping the ongoing sanctions.

Domestically, the situation must be strengthened in favor of the Iranian negotiation delegation, therefore the internal factions within the government must set aside their differences and everyone, hand-in-hand, must try to help. From an international point of view also, the U.S. is the axis of decision making of the P5+1 group countries. Up until now countries like China and Russia have used us, and when it was time for the final decision making about the UN Security Council resolutions they voted against Iran. In reality, we pay them a kind of a ransom without receiving any significant privileges in return.

If you remember, during Bill Clinton's presidency, when excessive unilateral sanctions were imposed, the European Union announced that the sanctions were against the World Trade Organization’s regulations and contrary to international laws. When Conoco company pulled out of South Pars Project, the French Total company replaced it to practically show the U.S. that they were opposed to such excessive sanctions. But in recent years, the European Union has changed its approach because of pressure from U.S. and has joined in with the additional unilaterial sanctions. So, if we were to succeed in reaching an agreement with the U.S., we would inevitably come to an agreement with the European Union as well.

Do you think Iranian officials understand American domestic politics? Recently President Rouhani implied at a news conference that it seems as though Congress and the White House have two different agendas when it comes to dealing with Iran. This seems a major over-simplification of the American political dynamic.

It has rarely happened in the history of the U.S. that an administration would have the majority in both  the House of Representatives and the Senate. Often, whether it was a Republican administration or a Democratic one, the administration usually did not have the same alignment in the Congress. Now the Democrats have a majority in the Senate, and the Republicans have the majority in the House of Representatives. This is nothing new, however we must be aware that the administration has asked for negotiations with Iran and the Congress has not taken an opposing stance. When the Executive Branch achieves a partial success, the Congressional atmosphere will also become more favorable. Sanctions are implemented according to the three bases that I pointed out, and success in negotiating with the U.S. administration can lead to changing the whole situation. Therefore, mentioning that there are differences between the Congress and the Presidentshould not be a basis for no action on Rouhani’s part.

Would it be reasonable for the Iranian government to wait to hear a unified voice from the American government?

This statement is nonsense. We cannot expect that all relevant institutions in the United States move in unison with joy and delight. Relations between the two countries in the past thirty-plus years have been strained, and sometimes hostile; and solving these difficult issues takes a lot of hardwork.

And of course in some situations the interests have been aligned...

Yes, after September 11, and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Iranian and the American interests were aligned, and Iran took advantage of this opportunity more than the United States. During the reign of Taliban we were ousted from our position in Afghanistan. With the arrival of the Americans we witnessed the return of Iran to Afghanistan, and we became  influential  in different arenas in the country. We had a role and influence in Iraq. Many say that Iran influences the events in Iraq, while there was no such during the era of Saddam Hussain.  Also inhibiting and preventing the spread of Salafism in the region has ended up in favor of Iran. In some situations it is possible that the interests of the two countries do align, but the countries themselves not have good relations. Currently, it would not be appropriate to expect all U.S. institutions to proceed in unison. When the Executive Branch, meaning Mr. Obama, gets to its desired goal in the negotiations, this would have positive effects on the Congress also. But nothing has happened so far.  

What do you see as the major difference between today and four years ago?

The strategy at the time was an offensive strategy, based on resistance and removal of threats, and looking to the East, relying on Russia and China. Eight years later, that strategy has ended in failure and disappointment. When a strategy does not deliver, then continuing it is detrimental to the country. That strategy has failed and a new strategy, which is détente and constructive dialogue, has replaced it, much like the strategies that were followed during Mr. Khatami's era, which was partly successful. The Americans, during the Clinton era, lifted the sanctions on caviar, pistachio, and carpets. Mrs. Albright expressed regret about the events of the 1953 coup and said, “The coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development.” At that time we entered into a constructive dialogue with the Europeans, and so the precedence for such a strategy also exists. Now the expectation is that we move on from the strategy of offense, resistance, and removal of threats and enter into the strategy of tension reduction and constructive dialogue. Up to now this was only a slogan but we are hopeful that this strategy will be implemented soon.

How much time does Mr. Rouhani have politically in order to take advantage of the spirit and the social environment that was created after the election, considering next year we will have the midterm elections in the U.S. which might change the political situation and the tone?

In that environment it won’t just be the issue of Iran alone. The situation in the Middle East, including Egypt and Syria, will also be brought up. These issues as a whole will be influencing the  the American midterm elections. All the crisis that is being felt in the Middle East is going to affect the election, even thought the issue of Iran is going to be an important issue among them. Iran is one of those issues. 

How much time do you foresee for the first step?

It is difficult to establish timetables in politics, as many factors are involved. Nothing in a political situation could be predicted in a definitive way. Two years ago, the Turkish Foreign Minister said with certainty that the Syrian government would fall within three months. But now it has been two-and-half years and the crisis remains. The issue of Iran is not a critical issue right now; there are more serious problems in the Middle East. Multiple problems have surfaced in Egypt and Tunisia. The crisis in Syria is becoming a regional crisis.

The elected officials in the Congress act according to what is important to their own local constituencies, be it the immigration issue, agriculture, gun control, and similar issues. Mr. Rouhani himself said he needed three months to evaluate what is needed and then make bold decisions. Now, how would you expect that in three months foreign political issues, with the existing expectations, get resolved? It is hardly imaginable that these problems would be solved in three to six months, however the expectation is that the initial steps must be taken in the direction that Mr. Rouhani has vowed. In reality, this is a step-by-step process. If the initial steps in the negotiations are successful, then this is a hopeful sign. I suspect this is a somewhat favorable environment and it is expected to lead to agreements in the next steps.

Mr. Rouhani will attend this week's meeting of the UN General Assembly. What kind of opportunity does this offer him? Is it possible, even accidentally, that Mr. Rouhani would meet the U.S. officials?

These are decisions for which he needs to have appropriate authority, unlike the kind of things that happened when Mr. Khatami was in New York. At that time Mr. Kharazi was the Foreign Minister. After the killings of several Iranian diplomats in Mazar Sharif, the Security Council had formed a committee, one of whose agenda items was to address and condemn the attack. The Iranian president is second in command in the country and accountable to the nation and to the Parliament (Majles). But instructions were given from Tehran that since Mrs. Madeleine Albright was participating, Mr. Kharazi was not to participate in the session and Mr. Zarif should participate in his place. If it is presumed that the president does not have the authority to decide for himself about a small issue like this, then nothing could move forward. Mr. Khatami was supposed to have a chance encounter with Mr. Clinton in a hallway, but Mr. Khatami preferred not to do so because he was worried about the Iranian conservatives.

If total authority and decision-making power is not given to Mr. Rouhani and to the negotiating delegation, and if instructions have to be dictated for everything, then his assignment cannot move forward. If they have recognized that negotiations must be held then he must have the authority to do so. If Mr. Obama expresses his desire to negotiate with Mr. Rouhani, then according to his own assessment, Mr. Rouhani must have the authority to act and accept.

Mr. Rouhani is very focused on subjects related to foreign policies, but many say that the more open the domestic political environment is, the more favorable conditions Mr. Rouhani will have during the negotiations. How do you consider that?

Foreign policy is the first priority, which does not need a decision from the cabinet. In matters related to the domestic issues, which are factional and sectarian issues, decision making becomes more difficult​​. But on foreign policy the main issue was the transfer of the nuclear case from the National Security Council to the Foreign Ministry. When the nuclear case arrives at the Foreign Ministry, then decision making would be come from within the Ministry and the president would face have any obstacles.