What Does Khamenei Mean by “Heroic Flexibility?”

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has created a stir this week by declaring that he supports “heroic flexibility” in diplomacy, during a speech to commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. The term has been the buzz of Iranian media since Khamenei uttered it, raising questions as to what precisely the supreme leader meant with his elusive phrasing.

This isn’t the first time Khamenei refers to “heroic flexibility.” On September 5, during a meeting with members of Assembly of Experts he said, “artistic and heroic leniency and flexibility in all political arena is desirable and acceptable,” though he cautioned that this  “maneuvering must not mean passing redlines, regressing from fundamental strategies, and disregarding the ideals.”

Even so, emphasizing these words in the presence of Guards' commanders, the powerful military and political figures most loyal to him, suggests that Khamenei is not playing with shades of meaning but signaling a new approach.

If “heroic flexibility” suggests a new approach, how can this nascent policy be interpreted? In the same speech, Khamenei outlined the main condition for this type of diplomatic flexibility to be exercised: “A technical wrestler may also show some flexibility on technical grounds occasionally, but does not forget who his opponent is and what his main goal is.”

What Khamenei is likely stressing here is that the Rouhani government’s diplomatic innovations must be limited to the technical area of Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei has said recently that though he is not optimistic about negotiations with the United States, he has issued permission for certain case-by-case negotiations. Talking about case-by-case negotiations is, in fact, a manifestation of the reason for diplomatic leniency. Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian nuclear negotiator, has recently said that the supreme leader has permitted President Hassan Rouhani to hold direct talks with the United States.

Khamenei also emphasized, however, that he expects the new cabinet to project an image of strength, as it is representing the regime politically alongside whatever new diplomacy it takes forward. He spoked repeatedly in his speech about the rightfulness of the Islamic Republic, the defeat of the West, and the importance of presenting a new model to the world. He stressed that Iran's relationship within the West and the handling of the nuclear crisis must be evaluated in the context of the West's dealings with Islam and the Iranian state.

One of the most significant aspects of the speech was Khamenei's efforts to prepare hardliners, especially the most radical, for the potential innovations, read concessions, of the Rouhani government.

During the era that Rouhani acted as lead nuclear negotiator, an atmosphere of recrimination developed around his handling of the diplomacy. Some hardine students began holding protests against him, and even though Khamanei defended some of Rouhani's decision, he ultimately said there had been a “retreat” from Iran's position and on his orders that “retreat” was reversed.

In recent years conservatives have invoked those statements by Khamanei to accuse Rouhani of capitulating to the West. The supreme leader's general support, at this sensitive juncture, can be a kind of preventive interference to ensure a favorable domestic political atmosphere. For the time being, that is, for it is possible that in the future, Khamenei will side with those who oppose compromise, as he has in the past.

The final point Khamenei sought to convey is that the Rouhani government's foreign policy reflects his authority. By speaking about diplomatic values and the Rouhani government's “innovations,” he was indirectly responding to the failures of Iranian foreign policy under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, when no institution seemed empowered to negotiate for Iran. To regain credibility, the Supreme Leader wants to send a message of diplomatic solidarity message to the world.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister and the official responsible for Iran’s nuclear dossier, said during his confirmation hearing that one of the most important aspects of his job will be ensuring that the world hears only one voice from Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei's present support is a step in this direction.

But Ayatollah Khamenei has also spoken of the historical background of this position. “I believe in the same thing which was named ‘heroic flexibility’ years ago,” he said. Khamenei, who takes special interest in the history of Islam, has always compared his contemporary decisions to historical examples that have guided him.

He has likened his political decision-making to the positions take in the early years of Islam by the faith's leaders. He likened his decision to put Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi under house arrest, for example, to the way the first Shia Imam dealt with two individuals close to the Prophet of Islam.

Regarding the “heroic flexibility,” the historical reference goes back to the time of the second Shia Imam. For better understanding of that historical period, one should refer to “Sulh al-Hassan,” a book written by Razi al-Yassin (1869-1953). Ali Khamenei translated this book into Farsi and picked its title as, “The Peace Treaty of Imam Hassan (PBH), The Most Splendid Heroic Flexibility in History.”

In his speeches, Iran’s Supreme Leader has described the peace treaty of the second Shia Imam with Moavieh. “It was one of the most difficult situations the Ahl al-Bayt Imams experienced after Prophet Muhammad, through these people. Imam Hassan (PBH), experienced such unbearable hardship with this peace, that no one—except through the help of God—can endure it. Yet he endured this great test with steadfastness and patience and came out of it proud, victorious, and accomplished in his goal—observing the rule of God, the Quran, the Prophet, and the best interest of Muslims.”

Based on these observations, perhaps it is safe to say that on a macro level, Iran’s Supreme Leader has decided to place the nuclear negotiations as a preface to political negotiations and to agree to a Hassan-like peace treaty?

It is not easy to answer this question. As mentioned before, Khamenei is a mercurial player with a long record of changing positions, both in foreign and domestic policy.

On the other hand, as he emphasized in this speech, he believes that Iran is on its way to progress and victory. In other words, he doesn’t believe that the political and social conditions ailing the second Shia Imam have yet emerged for him. Therefore we cannot necessarily call this interpretation as a big turnaround.

In May 2000 when Iran was negotiating with the West under considerably less pressure than today, Khamenei said, “Neither the US nor anyone bigger than the US—if it enjoys material power—is able to impose a situation like Hassan’s peace treaty on the Islamic World. If the enemy presses too hard, an incident like Karbala will occur.”

Western pressure has intensified over the past three years, and while there has been no “Karbala” in response, it remains to be seen whether Iran's political establishment will agree on precisely what “heroic leniency” will involve. It's indeed possible that some may interpret leniency on the order of Hassan's Peace Treaty. In which case, we could find ourselves hearing the supreme leader and his supporters talking about Ashoura.

Editor's Note: Yes, Iranian politics rhetorically involves numerous references to the early years of Islam and the rise of Shiism, and while these metaphors may be difficult to understand, it is worth the time spent to learn the context. Ashoura marks the death and martyrdom of the Shia Imam Hossein. It symbolizes, from a political-religious standpoint, pursuing the path of resistance to its heroic end, despite the prospect of certain death. Gloomy stuff.