As the United States edges closer to military action in Syria, the implications for a potential diplomatic deal with Iran loom large. The key backers supporting American intervention, Israel and Saudi Arabia, are motivated by their strategic rivalry with Iran, and have a vested interest in undermining a resolution to the Iranian nuclear stand-off. While Washington's ultimate objective with strikes on Syria remains unclear, it's evident that whatever happens will likely imperil negotiations with Iran's newly-elected moderate government. To explore the various Iranian dimensions to President Obama's Syria gamble, we turn to Reza Marashi, research director at the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), who was recently in Israel for a Track II meeting organized by Pugwash, a Nobel Peace Prize wining organization that works to reduce the dangers of armed conflict. Marashi discusses the mood in Israel on the eve of U.S. military strikes, U.S. and Israeli fears around a possible Iranian response, and what intervention will mean for America's arguably more urgent Iran problem.
How did you find the mood amongst policymakers and the media in Israel? Did they see this as an opportunity to further destabilize an old foe, or were they worried about the chaos that could follow in the wake of military strikes?
I sensed a quixotic mix of confidence and concern. On the one hand, many Israelis I spoke with saw an opportunity to take advantage of regional instability: shoring up support for the generals in Egypt; making its hold on the Golan Heights permanent; deflecting attention from the peace process; potentially creating new outreach to (and alliances with) Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states; and of course, destabilizing Iranian power in the region.
On the other hand, some Israelis were rightfully concerned about regional chaos – and how military strikes on Syria (or Iran) would almost certainly exacerbate this instability to even more dangerous levels. Across the board, Israelis preferred to operate in a low-key fashion so as to avoid drawing attention to themselves. That runs in direct contrast to their positions on Iran and Syria, where they have openly been urging the Obama administration to use military force in both countries – largely because they cannot do the job alone.
This is precisely what makes Israeli confidence and concern mutually exclusive: they cannot take advantage of status quo regional instability, while also urging military force on Syria and Iran that would exacerbate regional instability beyond levels that they are capable of predicting or controlling.
How is Iran factored into the policy debate around Syria in Israel right now?
Most of the Israelis I spoke to wanted to use American military force in Syria as a way of weakening Iran’s regional power. This is shortsighted for two reasons: 1) Iran has been cultivating ties with various factions in the deeply fractured Syrian opposition in an effort to preserve a notable degree of influence should Assad fall. This strategy is somewhat similar to Iranian efforts to cultivate ties with various political groups in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003; 2) For well over a year now, Iran has been willing to participate in multilateral negotiations on finding a political solution in Syria – for a price. Although the U.S. (as well as the Israelis and the Saudis) have refused Iran a seat at the table, many decision-makers in Tehran have been willing to cut off the head of the snake (Assad) in an effort to keep the body (key deep state Baath party institutions) as part of a negotiated settlement with the opposition.
With the election of President Rouhani, this school of thought in Tehran now occupies important positions of power. To date, none of the international actors with influence on the Syria issue – the U.S., the EU, Iran, Russia, and others – have put as much effort into diplomacy as they have into more destructive measures that hurt innocent Syrians. It’s not too late to recalibrate this and work towards a win-win solution.
Israel has taken a fairly quiet stance on the many of the Arab Spring upheavals. Has there been more vocal support for strikes on Syria after the recent chemical weapons attack?
Israeli support for American strikes on Syria was quite clear. For example: On the second day of our meetings, a senior Israeli official told us that America would bomb Syria on Sunday, and he outlined the details of the military operation. On Sunday, we were told that plans had changed, but no further details were provided. Call me skeptical, but I have a hard time believing that the President of the United States would approve a military operation on Saturday and call it off less than 24 hours later. As in real diplomacy, there is a degree of bluster involved in track-two diplomacy that aims to shape the thinking of others around the table.
What do you make of Rafsanjani's recent comments about Assad's chemical weapons use? And the government's later redaction as well. How did that play in Israel?
Rafsanjani’s comments and the subsequent redaction had not yet come to the fore during our discussions in Tel Aviv. I have since been in contact with some of my Israeli friends, and they see it as the Iranian government intentionally sending mixed messages in an effort to sow the seeds of confusion within the international community. With all due respect to my Israeli friends, I think they’re giving Rafsanjani and Iranian officials more generally too much credit. Sometimes, Iranian politics can be taken at face value: there are serious disagreements among key Iranian decision-makers on Tehran’s Syria policy. This latest episode with Rafsanjani is indicative of that – regardless of whether or not he actually made the comments.
In the event of US strikes, did you get the sense that the Israelis are anticipating a strong Iranian reaction, vis-a-vis Hezbollah? Was there general nervousness?
The Israeli approach was entirely contradictory: on the one hand, they wanted the U.S. to strike Syria and fully expected a strong Iranian reaction (vis-à-vis Hezbollah or otherwise), as demonstrated by their country-wide effort to dispense gas masks to Israeli citizens. On the other hand, this general nervousness was in direct contrast to their statements, the most far-reaching of which said that a U.S. strike on Syria would help improve the chances of diplomacy with Iran. If you think that, you haven’t been paying attention to Iranian words and deeds.
What implications will military action in Syria have for the United States when it sits down for nuclear talks with Iran?
If the U.S. bombs Syria, it will make nuclear negotiations with Iran exponentially more difficult. Smart Israelis know this, and my honest Israeli friends privately conceded that this was one key reason why they wanted Washington to strike Damascus. If hardliners in Tel Aviv convince empower hardliners in Washington to bomb hardliners in Syria, hardliners in Tehran will feel compelled to respond in kind. As a result, relative moderates in all four capitals are emasculated politically, and the hopes for a peaceful solution to a range of regional crises goes up in smoke – literally and figuratively.
Was there any optimism in Israel, either among officials or ordinary people, around Rouhani's election?
The Israelis I spoke with largely fell into two categories: those who see Rouhani as an opportunity for a peaceful solution to the conflict, and those who see him as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing.” The majority fell into the latter category. Despite the powerful message sent by millions of Iranian voters, some Israelis cling to misperceptions that the election firmly disproved. Some examples of these misperceptions include: “Rouhani is one of them”; “All Iranian officials are cut from the same cloth”; “Iran’s president is irrelevant because the Supreme Leader calls all the shots”; “Khamenei allowed Rouhani to win because of sanctions”; etc.
Although most Israelis I spoke with continue to misperceive political developments in Iran, others were willing to concede that something unexpected happened [with Rouhani's election], and they emphasized the importance of acknowledging the resulting political shifts in an effort to connect with relative moderates in Tehran who are looking to solve the conflict peacefully. To hear very senior current and former Israeli officials say this is a reason for optimism. And that optimism can be channeled into concrete action if leaders in Tehran and Tel Aviv are willing to take risks for peace, despite the backlash they’ll inevitably face from extremists at home.
From Washington's perspective, is Assad staying in control viewed as a greater threat, or the rise of jihadi, Qaeda-linked groups?
Frankly, it’s hard to tell at the moment. If you asked me a week or two ago, I would’ve told you that Washington viewed Al Qaeda-linked groups as a greater threat than Assad staying in control. More often than not, balancing interests and values is a delicate balancing act for the U.S. Of course we’ll try to achieve both, but reality, however, almost always forces us to choose. And nine out of ten times, we prioritize our interests over our values. In the case of Syria, Assad has long been a terrible dictator that opposes Pax Americana in the Middle East, but he’s the devil we know as opposed to the devil we don’t: The hodge-podge group of Al Qaeda extremists fighting Assad in Syria who actively seek to attack the United States.
Assad challenges American interests and values, and so does Al Qaeda – but only the latter is openly waging war against us. Obama knows this, and it’s been a key reason why he’s long avoided getting entangled militarily in Syria. Now that Obama has decided to push for war in Syria, it’s not entirely clear what he’s hoping to accomplish. He says the goal isn’t toppling Assad, but rather punishing him with “surgical strikes.” For a variety of reasons – not least of which is mission creep – that’s easier said than done. Based on the information that is publicly available today, it would appear that Obama is seeking to balance out the civil war in Syria so that neither side wins. Washington sees a weakened Assad as a blow to Tehran, and it’s unlikely to support the rebels to the point where they can permanently gain the upper hand. This strategy is eerily reminiscent to American policy during the Iran-Iraq war, when it covertly backed whichever side began to lose in an effort to bleed out both sides.
The Syrian civil war muddles this issue, but does Washington still see Iran as a potential partner in countering Al-Qaeda's influence?
That depends on how you define “Washington.” There are many pundits and policymakers inside the beltway that have long stressed the need for America to engage Iran on regional security issues such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and countering Al-Qaeda’s influence. But official “Washington” – the DC establishment, if you will – has consistently opposed engaging Iran on these issues. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have tried to simultaneously counter Iran and Al-Qaeda’s influence. The track record over the past 12 years speaks for itself, and I’d argue that our upcoming war in Syria will force us to choose: are we going to prioritize countering Iran’s influence or Al-Qaeda’s influence? I find it highly unlikely that we’ll be able to walk and chew gum at the same time – but I have no doubt that we’ll continue to try. As Winston Churchill famously quipped: “You can always rely on America to do the right thing – once it has exhausted the alternatives.”
Is there worry in Washington that the Revolutionary Guards will be pursuing a distinct Syria agenda of their own?
There aren’t many policymakers or pundits in Washington that differentiate between what the Revolutionary Guards are doing in Syria and Iran’s overall Syria policy. Not until recently have the long-standing fissures in Tehran over this issue been openly acknowledged in Washington. President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif’s recent remarks condemning the use of chemical weapons have caused some – though by no means a majority – in Washington to re-examine their assumptions on Iranian decision-making. Rafsanjani’s alleged remarks further stirred the pot. The irony in all of this is that Iran’s policy on Syria shares a key commonality with many of its other policies: key factions inside the Iranian system disagree on the proper course of action, and the actions of external actors will go a long way in empowering whichever faction emerges victorious in the internal policy debates.
Simply put, if Washington wants to empower more moderate elements in Tehran, it will find a way to engage with the Iranians on Syria. If Washington continues to push for solutions in Syria that ignore or work against Iranian interests, extremists in Tehran will be empowered to meet this escalation with escalatory measures of their own. This, in turn, will likely cause Iran to continue many of its undesirable policies in Syria that we’ve seen to date.
Did you eat Israeli salad while you were in Tel Aviv, and if so, did you tell them it was Salad Shirazi?
I did eat Salad Shirazi in Israel. When one of my Israeli friends asked if I liked “Israeli Salad”, I told him I didn’t realize that this particular kind of salad was created in 1948. Israelis appreciate a good sense of humor.
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