Dennis Ross: Sanctions Played an Important Role in Rouhani's Election

Ambassador Dennis Ross has been at the forefront of American diplomacy in the Middle East for over two decades, serving most recently as special assistant to President Obama and special advisor to Secretary Clinton focusing on Iran. Ross has held senior positions under both Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and his voice remains one of the most influential in American politics over a range of strategic issues spanning Europe, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union. Now a counselor at the Washington Institution for Near East Policy, his views on Iran continue to hold particular sway in Washington, and in a recent op-ed in the New York Times, he wrote candidly about the prospects Hassan Rouhani's election may hold for a nuclear compromise with Iran. He talked to IranWire about the need for a new approach to diplomacy that offers Iran an endgame scenario for civil nuclear power, and his belief that chances for an agreement are “reasonably good” should Iran prove itself serious.

Do you believe that sanctions partly deserve credit for Hassan Rouhani’s victory?

I do. I believe first of all that sanctions have demonstrated that there is a cost to the Iranian policy that has been pursued. It's pretty clear that Rouhani, who ran against international isolation – and even though the choices about who could run were heavily circumscribed to ensure that no one could be a candidate who wasn't acceptable to the supreme leader – who ran challenging the status quo, emphasizing the need to change this posture, to end Iran's isolation and try to deal with the economic consequences of sanctions and to try and transform that, was the person who won, and who won with 51 percent of the vote. So it's a pretty good indication that when the public is given a chance to express themselves, even when the choices are limited, they make their position very clear, and I think there's no doubt you see a kind of response on the sanctions.

One thing the election seemed to demonstrate is that the majority of Iranians back moderation and compromise. Is it important for the United States to demonstrate that it hears that message, and to somehow convey to the Iranian people that they are not the intentional target of sanctions?

I do think that it's important for the US and the Administration to explain very clearly why we have adopted the posture that we have. It is not against the Iranian people, it's against the behavior of the regime which insists on defying the will of the international community, on not answering the questions of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and which has adopted a posture of isolating itself. If the Iranians came into compliance with their international obligations, then they wouldn't be subject to the sanctions, but they refuse to do that. The leadership of the Iranian government has adopted a posture which basically has them wanting the ability to have civil nuclear power and to put themselves in a position where they could create weapons. So they want a nuclear capability but they don't want any of the responsibilities or obligations associated with it. As a result they have produced sanctions against them. So if there's a seriousness about wanting to find a way out, and about wanting to have sanctions lifted, they have to change their behavior on the nuclear program.

Sanctions that were passed a while back just recently came into effect this week, and others are being considered; none of these had anything to do with Rouhani's election, but for many Iranians they were viewed as a reaction and a slap in the face. With those outside the US not widely understanding how US politics work and the dynamic between the White House and Congress, does this not cause damage to US policy?

Let me make two points. First is that Congress is responding to and voting on what they see as the Iranian nuclear program, and the fact that it continues to march ahead. So I think that yes, what they're voting for right now was being proposed for some time. There's still a question of when sanctions get implemented, but there's also a larger issue here. Yes the Iranians have voted for someone who has expressed a different position, but he's also not the president yet, number one. Number two, nothing has changed in terms of Iranian program. The nuclear program continues to go ahead, without any change or slow down, and not only is it going ahead in terms of installation of more centrifuges, the installation and operation of the next generation of centrifuges, and continuing work on a heavy water plant, which puts Iran in a position where it could not only potentially build nuclear weapons using enriched uranium as the core, but with a heavy water plant it could have a plutonium based bomb as well.

So I think the point here is that there's a readiness on the American side to live with Iran having civil nuclear power, but only if it's prepared to change the character of program so that it can't put itself in the position where at a time of its choosing it can breakout and have nuclear weapons. So long as that's the posture Iran will pay the price. But the point is not to deny Iran nuclear power, the point is to ensure that Iran does not become a nuclear weapons state.

What is the most recent intelligence estimate you’re aware of that predicts when Iran might reach that breakout capability where it could weaponize?

Well I'm not privy to the intelligence estimates now, but based on what has been published and what President Obama has said, there are two different issues here. One is that how quickly  Iran could move to weapons grade enriched uranium, and there the time is relatively short. The other issue is how quickly could it choose to put that into a kind of metal sphere and miniaturize it so it could put it on top of a missile, and the estimates there are about a year.

You write that the “incremental, confidence-building approach within multilateral negotiation” has probably run its course, that the clock is ticking. How much time does Iran have before alternative scenarios are seriously considered, what is acceptable time frame?

Time is running out. Unless Iran unilaterally decides to change its program, then it could extend it. But if things remains as they are I think you have probably several months but not a lot more time than that. Certainly no later than the end of the year.

In recent years we've seen the negotiation track continue endlessly despite its basic failure, do you see that as a scenario that could extend indefinitely?

What happened this past year was that you had Almaty I and II. At Almaty I, the 5+1 made a series of moves, and those moves were designed to show that even on an incremental basis there would be a number of steps toward relaxing some of the pressures and some of the sanctions and there would be a number of steps that would allow the Iranians a bit more in terms of the program, meaning on the one hand precious metals wouldn't be sanctioned if the Iranians took certain minimal steps as related to limited enrichment to 20 percent, that not all of that had to be shipped out of the county, some could be saved for the Tehran Research Reactor even though the Iranians have now accumulated vastly more than they need for that reactor. That there also could be some lifting of some of the banking sanctions or some of the financial sanctions.

There was a sense on the 5+1's part that they had actually made a series of moves and when Almaty II took place, the Iranians decided nothing. There was an expectation that they would come back with something, and they came back with nothing. And that soured just about everybody on the 5+1 and once again demonstrated that the Iranians were using the talks purely to stretch out the time while they were continuing their program, so I don't think there's any appetite for continuing those kinds of discussions.

You wrote in your recent New York Times op-ed that the election could offer a chance to move things in a new direction.

There clearly is a sense of possibility with the election, and what I was trying to get at in what I wrote is that that sense of possibility needs to be tested. But in my view it needs to be tested with a different approach. One of the issues that the Iranians have raised for a long time is not knowing in the end what we're prepared to accept as it relates to civil nuclear power, and what I'm suggesting is it's time for us to say that and for us to spell it out. And they should also understand that if they do it there will be a lifting of sanctions, but the point is they're not going to get sanctions lifted unless they change the character of their program in a way that makes it clear they will live with limitations on the program and allows them to have civil nuclear power but doesn't put them in a position where they can break out and have a nuclear capability and at time of their choosing confront the world with a fait accompli and demonstrate that they then have this ability.

This election showed that elite consensus around the nuclear program has been fractured, that was widely obvious in the debates. But there were also senior figures like Saeed Jalili and others who clung to their hardline, and Rouhani will need political cover with these types in order to take a first step. Is there any gesture America could make that would offer him that?

I don't think there should be a lifting of any sanctions because there's been no change in the program. They're continuing to go ahead. If there's some sort of demonstration on their part that they were, let's say, prepared either to slow it down or prepared to finally answer and satisfy the questions of the IAEA, that would be one thing. But we've seen no change there. So I don't envision a gesture where we will take the first step to relax pressures when it's the pressures in the first place that produced the election and when there's no change in the character of the program.

But I do think there's a difference between implementing new sanctions and voting them, so one could hold off on implementing these sanctions and that would be a signal that look, we're giving you a chance, because you're speaking differently. And that would be a way to signal that we are giving that chance, but I would also say it's time to change the character of the diplomacy, which is another signal which says look, you say that you never know what we're prepared to accept, well we're prepared to accept you having civil nuclear power, but this is how it will be constrained and this it what will be required in transparency to satisfy everyone that the limitations will be verifiable.

What signals could come out of Tehran that would suggest Rouhani is determined and capable of taking forth a new approach?

There are several things. One would be a readiness to resume talks very quickly. Two would be a readiness to meet bilaterally with United Sates. Three would be appointment of a new negotiator that would send a signal that there would be a seriousness about trying to work something out. The problem with Jalili is that he never adopted a posture that gave much room for any negotiation, so any of those three moves or some combination of them would clearly signal that it's a new day on the Iranian side as well, and I think if there were such signals, I think again you would see a readiness to have a serious effort to see if we could work something out. There's a collective desire to have diplomacy work, but not a collective desire to have Iranians put themselves in a position where they can have nuclear weapons.

Can you characterize the mood in the United States today – within the public, in the media, in Washington – around Iran? Has eight years of Ahmadinejad's antagonistic style, his Holocaust denial and talk of wiping Israel off the map, left any patience for giving Iran a chance?

There's a legacy, and the legacy has created a context of how Iran is perceived. And Iran is perceived as having made itself a pariah state. As a pariah state, the impulse is not to give it the benefit of the doubt. Iran's behavior raises a fair amount of questions about what its purposes are, and as a result there are very few people who think now is the time to make a gesture to the Iranians. The general perception is that any gestures to the Iranians are pocketed and taken as a sign that they can get away with doing what they're doing, and that somehow we want this to succeed more than they do, and that therefore just confirms them in their attitude that they don't need to change anything.

So I think there is a legacy and a context and a set of perceptions, and while there's an election of someone like Hassan Rouhani who is saying things that suggest he takes note of Iran's position and the need to change it, until one sees some indications of behavior there's going to be an interest in seeing if there's going to be something for real here but not an assumption.

There are three prominent relatively moderate leaders in senior positions in America today, from President Obama himself, to Secretary of State Kerry and Defense Secretary Hagel. Is this a golden opportunity for Iran?

I think there's no doubt that this is an administration that would like to resolve this with diplomatic means. I think that's just a fact. But it can't do it by itself. So the question is if the Iranians want a diplomatic way out there certainly is an attitude and perspective here to go along with that, but it has to be real, it can't be phony, and it can't be a diplomatic outcome that's cover for a nuclear program that allows them to at time of their own choosing breakout with nuclear weapons and present that to the world as a fact. So it has to be a real agreement. I think there’s a readiness to accept an outcome where Iran would have civil nuclear power, which is what they say they want. But there isn't readiness to accept an outcome where it's a subterfuge.

What role are Persian Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar playing in pressuring the United States to take a tough line with Iran. We learned from the Wikileaks cables of the Saudi king asking Washington to “cut the head off the snake.” How do you see these concerns playing into diplomacy with Iran, especially given the sectarian climate in the region?

They see Iran acting not only acting on the nuclear issue, they see them with proxies who threaten other states. They look at Hezbollah and see what Hezbollah is doing within Syria, they see Hezbollah Al-Kata'ib in Iraq, they see Iran engaging in acts of terror or its proxies in engaging in acts of terror. They think that Islamic Republic is led by those who are determined to gain hegemony within the region over them and to fight against them. And so there's a deep seated view that the Iranians don't adopt a position that's defensive they see that through a lens that’s extremely offensive. And it's only exacerbated by what you see taking place in the region as a whole right now.

Many Iranians I talk to truly cannot understand America’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear program, or, even indeed, an Iran that possess nuclear capability but exercises deterrent. They feel Iran would never attack Israel because its leaders are not stupid or irrational. What is the real reason?

I think that the Israeli concerns are a factor, but they're not the reason that the President adopted an objective of prevention. He adopted an objective of prevention because he believes that if Iran were to have a nuclear weapons capability it would guarantee that the Saudis would decide that they have to have it as well, that Turkey would decide they have to have it as well. And with all the turmoil in the region with a country like Egypt, even when it sorts itself out, will feel that they have to have it as well, and a nuclear armed middle east is something that is not ironically in Iran's interest, but it's also not in anybody's interest.

The rules of the road that existed during the cold war are not so likely to exist in a world where no country in the region could feel that they could afford to strike second, so everyone will be on a hair trigger. Where at least between Iran and Israel there is no communication, where the kind of communication and intelligence is faulty or likely to be faulty between Iran and its southern neighbors, and where possibility of wars of miscalculation would be quite high. And given the consequences of a war with nuclear weapons, that's just a risk that's unacceptable. So if the issue was only concern about Israel, you could easily see that the administration might have adopted a position of containment and then deterring the Iranians. But containment doesn't prevent others from feeling that, they for their own reasons, for security, psychology and the like, if Iran has this capability they have to have it to. Which is why the Iranian posture is so self-defeating from the standpoint of its own interests. 

Are you skeptical about future negotiations?

If Iran is serious about wanting a diplomatic way out, then I think the chances of there being an agreement are reasonably good. But it has to be for real, and it can't be something that's just a kind of subterfuge or once again using talks as a means of gaining time. There has to be a serious approach, and if there's a readiness to be serious, the Iranian people might find there's a real readiness to be serious certainly by the United States and I think by others as well. So it really depends on whether the Iranian leadership wants a posture that allows it to end its isolation, or does it want to continue to pursue a posture where it basically declares a kind of war on everybody else. So I think there is a moment here that creates a possibility, but it has to be real and if it is for real then I think there's a reason to be somewhat hopeful. But at this point I think there's probably an awful lot of skepticism on the outside, and time will tell whether that skepticism is appropriate or not.