Ahmadinejad’s Paving the Way to Run for President Next Year

So far, no president for the Islamic Republic has been successful in winning the presidency for a second time after their initial eight-year term: not Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was president from 1989 to 1997 and ran again in 2013; not Mohammad Khatami, president from 1997 until 2005 and who put himself forward again in 2005; and not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, president from 2005 to 2013 and who tried to run again in 2017. 

Chief amongst those who oppose the idea of returning presidents is the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The most blatant manifestations of this opposition were the disqualification of Hashemi Rafsanjani in 2013 and Ahmadinejad in 2017.

In return for his aspirations, Ahmadinejad received a sharper blow from Ayatollah Khamenei than Hashemi Rafsanjani did. For the first time, the leader of the Islamic Republic publicly announced his opposition to a candidate for the presidential election.

Although Khamenei disqualified Ahmadinejad ahead of the last election, he did not deny the former president his right to run again. But he has paid close attention to Ahmadinejad and his plans, and to the speculation among some politicians and the media in recent weeks that he might run again in 2021. Ahmadinejad’s own comments have fed into the debate: "I have not thought about the elections and I personally do not want to be a candidate, but like all Iranians, I'm ready to sacrifice.”

Although in the current environment the possibility of Ahmadinejad becoming president is still far-fetched, there have been various shifts in the political atmosphere that make it less outlandish than it was a few months back. The economic situation and dissatisfaction with Hassan Rouhani's government and foreign policy are part of this shift, as is the relatively new absence of the powerful Larijani brothers from the political scene.

The fact that two of the Larijani brothers — Sadegh, who was head of the judiciary until 2019, and Ali, who was the speaker of parliament until earlier this year — no longer hold key positions has given Ahmadinejad and his allies a boost. The trial of Akbar Tabari, Sadegh Larijani’s deputy while he was head of the judiciary, and attacks on him personally have prompted Ahmadinejad’s supporters to claim victory in closing in on one of Iran’s most toxic pockets of corruption, a victory that they say conservative principlists were unable to achieve. Even before this assumed victory, Ahmadinejad’s camp has faced less criticism since the arrival of Ebrahim Raeisi in the top job in the judiciary. 

The Raeisi Connection and the Economy

Some of Raeisi’s current advisers were also government officials under Ahmadinejad. When, during the 2017 presidential election Raeisi commented on the debate between President Hassan Rouhani and Ahmadinejad, Rouhani responded:: "We are ready to debate with Mr. Raeisi himself because the members of the previous government are at his headquarters."

Confidence about Ahmadinejad’s ability to gain more power has grown because of the close ties between his supporters and Raeisi. "If a candidate approved by the Guardian Council, for example, a person like Mr. Raeisi, chooses Ahmadinejad as his first or second deputy, this will have a great impact on his votes,” said Abbas Amirifar, a close ally of Ahmadinejad.

Although there is still no indication that Ebrahim Raeisi will run for the 2021 elections as he did in 2017, this could be a message to other principlist candidates and members of the government: this time, Ahmadinejad will be satisfied with a symbolic presence as the first deputy. Yet this particular model had already been proposed in both the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections and so probably won’t gain much ground. And it is unlikely that other conservative candidates will want to take the risk of choosing Ahmadinejad to be their first deputy and have to contend with his shadow hanging over them. Only Ahmadinejad’s closest allies would make such a move, and realistically they have very little chance of gaining Guardian Council approval. 

The current state of Iran’s foreign and domestic policies also give Ahmadinejad supporters reasons to be hopeful. And while there is little reason Iran’s electorate or political environment will be friendly to conservative candidates, many political figures have said it would be hard to see how many of the current policies will be transferred to the next administration, not least because of external pressures. So some Ahmadinejad supporters believe he has a chance to win votes and that he could even launch fresh negotiations with the United States. Others oppose this theory, saying the obstacle to negotiations with the United States is not the president, but the leader of the Islamic Republic, and that talks will only be possible with his permission. In this context, it doesn’t matter what votes or support a presidential candidate gains when it comes to US relations. 

The economic crisis and the protests of 2017 and 2019, sparked by this crisis, have prompted Ahmadinejad's supporters to declare with confidence that the former president’s policies to alleviate the problems of the poor were more effective than those of the Rohauni government.

Ahmadinejad: Has he Changed? 

Ahmadinejad's main problem, however, is the approval of the Guardian Council. In 2017, he disobeyed the Supreme Leader’s order not to run for office. The Supreme Leader is unlikely to forget such a public display of disobedience, which further damaged a fragile relationship wrecked by Ahmadinejad’s eight years as president. The Leader and his advisors simply don’t trust Ahmadinejad. Perhaps this is why some of Ahmadinejad's entourage have argued that the former president has shifted his outlook in some respects. "There are signs that Mr. Ahmadinejad has changed his former team in his office and brought in more knowledgeable people, and there is no longer any mention of Mr. Baghaei and Mr. Mashaei,” Amirifar has said, referring to Ahmadinejad’s two closest allies, both of whom were handed down prison sentences in 2018. He said neither man had any role in Ahmadinejad’s current office or activities. 

Despite these promises, it is unclear to what extent such changes have restored Khamenei’s lost trust. Ahmadinejad has made several controversial statements in recent years, so his allies’ efforts to present him as reliable may not have been effective. Bahman Sharifzadeh, another cleric close to Ahmadinejad, said he would not run for presidency if he was disqualified. Principlist political activist Nasser Imani has said Ahmadinejad is absolutely determined to run in the next presidential election, but acknowledges that the Guardian Council is unlikely to approve him.

Although Khamenei will not be rushing to secure Ahmadinejad’s candidacy, the regime will want a new government that will bring in change, given the terrible state of  Iran’s economy and position on the world stage. Because he will not want any incoming president to make concessions to the reformists, the Supreme Leader could accept the prospect of Ahmadinejad’s return. 

Ahmadinejad is well aware that there is a difficult path before him, and even that his bid to leave his current quiet office in Velenjek to return to the presidential office in Pasteur Street might be impossible. But he also knows that just him talking about running attracts attention, and that the political pundits, the papers, and even members of the ordinary public will once again be talking about him, a reminder that he still has impact.