On February 26, Iranians went to the polls in elections for parliament, and for a powerful group of Islamic scholars called the Assembly of Experts. Reformist and centrist candidates made substantial gains in both bodies. Although all the winning candidates were pre-vetted by Iran’s top clerics, and are all bound to operate within strict limits imposed by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, some Iranians maintain high hopes.
Many remember fondly a previous era of reform under the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), and the victory reformists won in Iran’s Sixth Parliament in 2000. They remember, too, the reformist hopes raised by candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi during the 2009 elections, before Mahmoud Ahmadinejad began his second term, and before both men were placed under house arrest in 2011.
But with a more securitized atmosphere prevailing in Iran today, and the reformists of old in official disgrace, what can today’s reformists hope for? Here are some frequently asked questions.
Q: Can Rouhani free Mousavi and Karroubi?
A: During his 2013 election campaign, Rouhani promised to seek the release of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, leaders of Iran’s 2009 Green Movement. But much as he may hope to free them, he lacks the power and influence. The matter is in the hands of Iran’s conservative judiciary, of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In addition to Rouhani, one conservative MP, Ali Motahari, has also opposed both men’s house arrest. Supreme leader Ali Khamenei, however, has said that if the men were tried instead, the verdict would be so severe that it is best for them to remain under house arrest. Unless Rouhani or his reformist allies can change Khamenei’s mind, Mousavi and Karroubi will stay where they are.
Q: Can Rouhani rehabilitate former president Khatami?
A: Hassan Rouhani owes his presidency to Mohammad Khatami, who used his popularity back in 2013 to help get Rouhani elected. But since then, Iran’s conservative judiciary has taken a hard stance against Khatami, banning Iranian media from mentioning or depicting him. Khatami’s behind-the-scenes influence over the 2016 elections—evident through his social media communications asking the public to vote for his reformist “list”—is likely to harden conservative ire even further. Rouhani has not proved able to influence the judiciary, so Khatami will still have to keep a low profile. Rouhani will remain, in a sense, his public face.
Q: Are hardliners metamorphosing into reformists?
Critics of Iran’s “reform” process have raised the alarm about the type of people passing for reformists these days, citing the presence of two former intelligence ministers, Mohammad Reyshari and Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi, on the reformist “list.” Both men made the list for Assembly of Experts candidates, and would be poised to help choose a new supreme leader if Khamenei died. But their presence on the list comes down more to numbers than values, and reveals the reformists’ limited room for manoeuvre. Reyshari and Dorri-Najafabadi were simply less anti-Rouhani than any alternative candidates. The reformists’ main goal was to confront the three most anti-Rouhani clerics, namely Ahmad Jannati, Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi and Mohammad Yazdi, in the Assembly elections. Although reformists succeeded in eliminating Yazdi and Mesbah-Yazdi, they will have to live with some unpalatable choices.
Q: Will reformists choose the next supreme leader?
A: Even if Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dies in the next 8 years (he’s only 76) no new leader can be appointed with less than two thirds of the vote in the Assembly of Experts. Reformists do not control the Assembly. But Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a founding figure of the Islamic Republic who now styles himself as godfather of the reformist camp, does now lead a strong faction within the Assembly. Rafsanjani could potentially lead a minority of members to reject a too-conservative choice for supreme leader. But it is Khamenei himself who will likely wield the greatest influence. Should he record his wishes about his succession, the Assembly could hardly disobey. The Revolutionary Guards, in any case, would likely enforce Khamenei’s decision.
Q: How will “hardliners” behave now that they have lost?
A: Iranian hardliners and conservatives love a game of whack-a-mole. When reformists do well on one front, they display their power on others. A good example would be the dramatic spike in the number of death sentences Iran’s conservative judiciary imposed after Rouhani won the presidency in 2013. Following this year’s elections, hardliners have already turned their verbal ire on, among others, the people of Tehran, who elected reformists to all 30 of Tehran’s seats in Iran’s 290-seat parliament. Some hardliners have complained that Tehranis are not pro-Islamic Republic, and are out of step with the country. Others have blamed foreign powers, claiming reformists owe their success to a strategic “British list” concocted in London. History suggests they will likely deploy their most useful weapon—a judiciary loyal to Khamenei—to keep reformists tied down.
Q: What economic and social reforms can Rouhani achieve?
A: Rouhani can now expect greater support from parliament as he seeks normalisation of Iran’s relations with the international community, and greater foreign investment, as well as greater privatisation of Iran’s economy. But while Rouhani hopes to overturn the monopolies of government agencies, and has even made thinly veiled criticisms of the economically powerful Revolutionary Guards, most MPs will think twice about risking challenging the Guards, even rhetorically.
On social matters, such as restrictions facing women and minorities, Rouhani will be relieved to find a parliament no longer dominated by MPs pursuing agendas contrary to his own. But MPs are not the only people imposing social conservatism in Iran. Conservative clerics also make their views known on such issues as women’s role in society, and the roles minorities can play in an Islamic government. Top clerics can set the tone for Iranian politics, and can persuade their supporters to fill the streets in protest if their wishes are not met. And while Ayatollah Khamenei does not always voice his opinions on such matters, MPs will submit to his wishes if he does.
This article is based on a conversation with an Iranian analyst who prefers not to be named.
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