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Opinions

The Principalist’s Clench on Rouhani’s Cabinet

August 2, 2013
Reza HaghighatNejad
3 min read
The Principalist’s Clench on Rouhani’s Cabinet
The Principalist’s Clench on Rouhani’s Cabinet

The Principalist’s Clench on Rouhani’s Cabinet

President-elect Hassan Rouhani will be inaugurated this Sunday at 4 pm, Tehran time, and it is widely believed that he will unveil his cabinet during his inaugural address. The Iranian press is swirling with reports and debate over specific nominees, and their varying chances of actually making it onto the 11th administration of the Islamic Republic. In the aftermath of Rouhani's victory, debate has centered around whether the newly elected president is actually a “moderate” at all, or just another establishment figure allied to the status quo. The prominent political analyst and professor of political science at Tehran University, Sadeh Zibakalam recently said, “80 to 90 percent of Hassan Rouhani belongs to the Principalist faction and 10 to 20 percent belongs to the Reformists.”

That summation doesn't seem so outlandish now, as the cabinet's prospects take shape. The fact that Abdolreza Rahimi-Fazli is going to be the Interior Minister in Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet is certainly unexpected. He is so close to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani that wherever Larijani goes, Fazli follows. Literally. To date, Rahimi-Fazli has followed Larijani to his positions at: Iranian state broadcasting network IRIB, the National Security Council, and the Parliament, just to name a few. And now supposedly he will have his finger on the pulse of Rouhani’s cabinet. Although Rahimi-Fazli had experience as member of parliament, he isn’t known for any kind of political prowess. He is set to be confirmed for one of the most important political positions in Rouhani’s cabinet.

The most important responsibility of being the Interior Minister is selecting the governors of the provinces. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani controls and yields much influence among a faction of Principalists in the parliament. The majority of Principalists under his influence are representatives from Iran’s smaller cities. In contrast, the Tehran Principalists are either independent or look towards Tehran representative Gholam Reza Hadad-Adel as their Principalist factional leader. Now that Rahimi-Fazli is being considered as the Interior Minister, it would seem natural that Larijani would approve this selection as this would in reality secure his own expansion of political influence on a national level. The Reformists currently don’t have any hope for a Rouhani cabinet position, and there is a strong possibility that they won’t even be considered for a mid-level cabinet position.

But Rahimi-Fazli isn’t the only Principalist being considered for a high-level cabinet position in Rouhani’s administration. Ali Jannati, the son of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who currently heads Iran’s Guardian Council, is considered a front runner for the important post as head of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which has direct control of national media. Jannati’s closeness to Larijani makes him a virtual lock for this position, and it should be remembered he also served under Larijani during his tenure as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance. With these two choices for cabinet positions, it would seem that Rouhani would have consolidated a national political network of officials as well as the national media.

Interestingly enough, the list of Principalists doesn’t end there, but actually increases. Here are a few more Principalists who are believed to be potential nominees, all of whom have extensive backgrounds in positions or groups closely associated with the Supreme Leader: Mohammed Nahavandian. Mohsen Qomi, Ahmad Vahidi, Hossain Ali-Amiri, and Mohammed Javad Zarif who actually is the only potential nominee that has caused alarm in some of the Principalist camps as “having connections in the U.S.”

The closer we get to Rouhani’s official cabinet announcement, it seems that the quality and quantity of Principalists in his cabinet increases. If these positions actually materialize for the Principalists, they’re presence in Iran’s political and social spheres of influence will greatly marginalize the reformists. Rouhani’s embrace of the Principalist camp wasn’t unexpected and could even be thought of as predictable, but not at this degree or strength. 

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